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ANCIENT SIMPLICITY IS GONE:
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF RELIEF FROM TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION
Lee F. Davis Jr.*
The Virginia Supreme Court has referred to "the convenience,
elasticity and fairness" of the Virginia procedure for the correction
of erroneous assessments of taxes.' Few would add "clarity" to this
description, yet the statutory remedies, however complicated, are
usually the only source of relief for the taxpayer.2
Prior to 1973, declaratory judgment actions were often used to
obtain tax relief in Virginia. Although one observer questioned
whether a taxpayer could use the declaratory judgment procedure
to obtain tax refunds in Virginia, 3 the practice continued, due in
part to an understandable tendency among lawyers to use tools with
which they are familiar,4 and in part to an understandable reluct-
ance on the part of state and local governments to interpose proce-
dural defenses in tax matters.' The question was finally resolved in
Perkins v. County of Albemarle,' a declaratory judgment action in
which the Virginia Supreme Court initially held the county's tax
assessment procedures to be unconstitutional and directed:
Such [unlawful] taxes collected must be refunded. Such [unlawful]
taxes yet uncollected must be abated.7
Upon rehearing, however, the court said:
This language has been interpreted to command Albemarle County
* B.A., 1961, Duke University; M.B.A., 1963, LL.B., 1967 University of Virginia.
1. Commonwealth v. Tredegar Co., 122 Va. 506, 511, 95 S.E. 279, 281 (1918).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1158 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
3. Horsley, Taxation, 1961-1962 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1554, 1569
(1962).
4. See, e.g., Krauss v. City of Norfolk, 214 Va. 93, 197 S.E.2d 205 (1973).
5. "In the Valentine case [City of Richmond v. Valentine, 203 Va. 642, 125 S.E.2d 854
(1962)], declaratory judgment procedure was stipulated by the parties to expedite the pro-
ceedings. . . ." Horsley, Taxation, 1961-1962 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 48 VA. L. REV.
1554, 1569 (1962).
6. 214 Va. 240, 198 S.E.2d 626 (1973).
7. Id. at 245, 198 S.E.2d at 629.
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to refund or abate taxes upon its own initiative. We intended no such
construction. This is a declaratory judgment proceeding. The stat-
utes make available to aggrieved taxpayers separate proceedings for
refund and abatement of taxes unlawfully imposed. Having made a
judgment declaring certain taxes unlawful, we leave taxpayers upon
whom Albemarle County levied such unlawful taxes, including the
plaintiffs and intervenors, to pursue their remedies as the statutes
provide."
The Virginia Code provides four methods for the correction of
erroneous assessments of most state taxes: an application to the
State Tax Commissioner;9 an amended tax return; 0 an application
to court, either by the taxpayer," or by the assessing officer.1" In
addition, the taxpayer has a common law right to bring an action
of assumpsit for money had and received if the taxes were paid
under compulsion. 13 Each of these methods is hazardous.
Section 58-1153 of the Code of Virginia, providing for a court
application by the assessing officer, should not be relied on. This
method requires an order of exoneration "upon forms prescribed by
the Department of Taxation."' 4 No such forms have been pre-
scribed. The section would be invoked by an administrative officer
only in a highly unusual situation, and therefore merits no further
discussion herein.
The remaining statutory methods for correction of erroneous as-
sessments of state taxes apply to "taxes administered by the De-
partment of Taxation," a term undefined by the Code. The State
8. Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 416, 419, 200 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1973). The danger
in using the wrong procedure is that the statute of limitations may run on a taxpayer's right
to pursue his statutory remedies. This happened in Perkins, but the Albemarle Board of
Supervisors arranged for the amendment of VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1152.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974), to
permit the County to return the erroneously collected taxes voluntarily. Va. Acts of Assembly
1974. ch. 362, at 596.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1130 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1153 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
13. Charlottesville v. Marks' Shows, Inc., 179 Va. 321, 18 S.E.2d 890 (1942). Mere protest,
however vigorous, is not sufficient to cause the payment to be under compulsion. Phoebus v.
Manhattan Social Club, 105 Va. 144, 52 S.E. 839 (1906). Nor is the payment compulsory even
if the taxpayer's alternative to payment would be to close his business. Virginia Brewing Co.
v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 145, 73 S.E. 354 (1912).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1154 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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Tax Commissioner has general supervisory authority over all state
taxes,' 5 but the taxes administered by the Department of Taxation
should be considered those set forth in the Department of Taxa-
tion's Annual Report to the Governor of Virginia for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 30, 1972.11
The statutes in question were amended in 1973 to delete the re-
quirement that the taxes be "State" taxes, 17 resolving the problem
encountered when attempting to get refunds of the local comple-
mentary retail sales and use tax which is administered by the De-
partment of Taxation. The 1972 amendment, the first to utilize the
term "taxes administered by the Department of Taxation,"'" indi-
cates that state recordation taxes (which were not set forth in the
Department's 1971 Annual Report) were now to be included." The
Department of Taxation is given no authority to administer local
recordation taxes. Therefore relief from the state recordation tax
will not automatically assure relief from its local equivalent; how-
ever, such will almost certainly be the practical result. 0
Filing of an Amended Tax Return
The Virginia Code fixes a three year statute of limitations for the
filing of an amended tax return s.2 The statute of limitations is ex-
tended in the case of taxes conforming to a federal equivalent if
there is an adjustment of the federal tax liability. At present, Vir-
ginia's only conforming taxes are its income taxes22 and the mini-
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-33(1) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
16. These taxes include: Individual and corporate income taxes, the Virginia retail sales
and use tax, inheritance taxes, gift taxes, state recordation and probate taxes, tax on capital
not otherwise taxed, state taxes on shares of stock of banks and trust companies, state
business, occupational and professional license taxes, malt beverage excise taxes, tobacco
products excise taxes, and miscellaneous excise taxes on forest products, eggs, peanuts, hogs
and soybeans.
17. Va. Acts of Assembly 1973, ch. 446, at 686.
18. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1160 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended Va. Acts of Assembly 1972,
ch. 721, at 1013, fixes a filing date for a fictitious return of recordation tax.
20. There seems to have been no statute permitting a refund of local recordation taxes until
the 1974 amendment of VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1145 (Repl. Vol. 1974), Va. Acts of Assembly
1974, ch. 326, at 505. An application to court should comply with the formalities of both
section 58-1130 and section 58-1145.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
22. VA. CODE ANN. Title 58 ch. 4 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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mum inheritance tax based on the federal estate tax credit for state
taxes paid.13
One danger in the amended tax return procedure is that the stat-
ute of limitations for obtaining judicial relief is not extended as to
matters previously raised.24 The term "matters first raised by the
amended return" should be construed to exclude from the extension
of time only those matters raised by assessment of omitted taxes
pursuant to Section 58-1160.25 This restriction should not be con-
strued to apply to matters previously raised with respect to different
tax periods nor to matters raised in oral discussions or informal
correspondence with the Tax Department.
Most disputes with the Tax Department arise in reference to an
audit. Virginia law contains no provision for pre-assessment nego-
tiations with the Tax Department. If, as in the case of field audits,
the taxpayer is aware that an additional assessment is being pro-
posed, he may request and will usually receive an opportunity to
discuss the proposed assessment with the auditor's supervisors. The
level of the conference will generally depend on the magnitude of the
issues being raised. This procedure is especially useful if the auditor
proposes to assess statutory penalties; for under Virginia law, the
courts have no authority to relieve a taxpayer of penalties and inter-
est if the underlying tax is upheld. 8 In no event, however, should a
pre-assessment conference be considered an application to the Com-
missioner under Section 58-1118.27
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-162 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1160 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Sections 58-1118 and 58-1118.1 should be
construed as complementary, the amendment and enactment, respectively, of these sections
resulting from the same act of assembly. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013. Section
58-1118 measures the statute of limitations by the mailing of the assessment. The only
assessments which are mailed are inheritance and gift tax assessments and supplemental
assessments of omitted taxes. The same session of the General Assembly revised the inheri-
tance tax so as to eliminate the need for mailing inheritance tax assessments, and implicitly,
to eliminate the need for mailing gift tax assessments. The due dates for the filing of inheri-
tance tax returns and for the payment of the tax were made identical, thus requiring that
payment accompany the return. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 140, at 144. Gift tax returns
and payment were already due on the same date. Although sections 58-174 and 58-244 con-
tinue to provide that the department shall "determine" inheritance and gift taxes and send
a statement to the taxpayer, the department does not do so unless additional taxes are due.
See text accompanying note 35 supra.
26. Rixey's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 337, 99 S.E. 573 (1919).
27. This distinction would be important if existing law is changed, as was proposed in 1972
by House Bill 579, to make the administrative application a prerequisite to the judicial
remedy.
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Applications to the State Tax Commissioner
Section 58-1118 provides the means for making an application to
the State Tax Commissioner to correct an erroneous assessment.28
It requires that the application be filed within ninety days from the
mailing of the assessment to the taxpayer. After the expiration of
the ninety day period, the Commissioner may grant relief only on
an offer of compromise. 2 The statutory provisions excluding Satur-
day, Sundays and holidays from due date computations' and per-
mitting filing by mail,31 unlike their federal equivalents, 32 are lim-
ited to the filing of returns and the payment of taxes and do not
apply to the filing of applications.
The application under Section 58-1118 must contain all relevant
facts and the Commissioner may request additional information.
The taxpayer should be aware that subsequent judicial relief is
prohibited unless the court is "satisfied . . .that the erroneous
assessment was not caused by the willful failure or refusal of the
applicant upon request to furnish. . . relevant information to the
tax-assessing authority as the law requires. 13 3 Obviously, lawyers
who favor surprise as a courtroom weapon may prefer not to apply
for administrative relief. The taxpayer who does utilize the adminis-
trative remedy must keep one eye on the clock because, since the
repeal of former Section 58-1131,31 the judicial statute of limitations
is not tolled while the administrative application is pending. 3
Under House Bill 579, as originally introduced in 1972, an appli-
cation to the Tax Commissioner would have been a prerequisite to
the filing of an application to court. However, this provision was
deleted, not because of hostility toward making the administrative
28. A conference may, and usually should, be requested but the hearing may be held by a
lower level employee of the Tax Department to whom the Commissioner has delegated au-
thority under VA. CODE ANN. § 58-2(2) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-45 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-4.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-4.2 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7503 and 7502.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
34. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
35. House Bill 579, as originally introduced in 1972, would have begun the running of the
statute at the time of the Commissioner's determination with respect to the section 58-1130
application. When the General Assembly deleted the amendments to section 58-1130 from
the bill, it did not restore section 58-1131. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
1974]
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application a prerequisite to the judicial application, but because
the proposed amendment would also have designated specific courts
as the only courts of original jurisdiction in tax matters. Thus, the
simultaneous repeal of former Section 58-1121,11 which provided
that the administrative remedy was in addition to the judicial rem-
edy, should not be interpreted as making the administrative remedy
a prerequisite for, or an exclusive alternative to, the application to
court.
The Taxpayer's Application To Court
An application to court, while on the law side of the court,37 is not
subject to the Rules of Court. 8 It is not clear whether the exclusion
in Rule 3:1 prevents the application of pretrial procedures under
Part Four of the Rules 9 or whether the Tax Commissioner is a
"party" as that term is used in Part Four." Generally, however, the
Tax Commissioner and the Attorney General will provide and stipu-
late such information as is relevant.
The initial question in a judicial application is the date on which
the action is commenced for statute of limitations purposes. The
statute which provided that the period of limitations was tolled
between the time of the filing of the application and the hearing,
was repealed in 1972.11 The implication of this repeal is that the case
must actually be heard within the two year statutory period, and
that the filing of the application no longer tolls the statute of limita-
tions .42
36. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
37. Barrow v. Prince Edward County, 121 Va. 1, 92 S.E. 910 (1917).
38. Barbour v. City of Roanoke, 207 Va. 544, 151 S.E.2d 398 (1966).
39. Rule 3:1 provides that "These Rules" apply to certain actions, in contrast to Rule 4:0
which provides for the application of "The rules in this Part Four". Part Five of the Rules of
Court is apparently made applicable to tax cases by VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1157 (Repl. Vol.
1974).
40. The statutes do not "in terms provide for the naming of any defendant." Barbour v.
City of Roanoke, 207 Va. 544, 547, 151 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1966). In School Board v. Shockley,
160 Va. 405, 168 S.E. 419 (1933), the court said, with reference to a local tax case: "We
therefore think the county school board of Carroll County had the right to become a party
defendant in the proceedings in the lower court". 160 Va. at 410, 168 S.E. at 421. (emphasis
added). Section 58-48.4 overrides the Rules of Court with respect to confidential tax returns
and section 58-48.5 permits the Commissioner's affidavit to be used in evidence in certain
situations.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1131, repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
42. The initial statutory language was as follows: "The application aforesaid may in all
[Vol. 9: 121
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Rule 3:1 provides that the "established practices and procedure
[as of February 1, 1950] are continued" for cases not covered by
the Rules. Under the statutes then in effect,43 actions were com-
menced by the issuance of a writ to summons the defendant, and
the writ was deemed issued when the writ tax, clerk's fee and order
were received by the clerk. This led the lower court judge in Barbour
v. City of Roanoke" to conclude that a local tax proceeding was
commenced when notice was served on the city attorney, he being
the one required to defend the application." The Virginia Supreme
Court, however, noted that the applicable statutes did not "in terms
provide for the naming of any defendant" and said that it was "not
necessary to look beyond the statute [creating the right] for addi-
tional limitations in established practice and procedure."46 Relying
on the local tax equivalent of repealed Section 58-1131, 7 the court
then held that the filing of the petition within the statutory period
was sufficient. Since the repeal of Section 58-1131, the court's rea-
soning in Barbour no longer applies to a state tax case.4" Therefore,
cases be filed in the clerk's office of any such court in vacation, and the time which shall
elapse from the filing of such application in the clerk's office, as aforesaid, to the hearing on
the same by the court, shall be excluded from the computation of the said period of one year
or two years, as the case may be," Va. Acts of Assembly 1926, ch. 353, at 644. This statute
followed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Leesburg v. Loudoun Nat'l Bank, 141
Va. 244, 126 S.E. 196 (1925). In that case, notice was served on the proper parties within the
statutory period, but the court held that the action was not timely commenced:
We think the language of the statute is conclusive on this point and that the applica-
tion must actually be made, and made directly to the court, within two years from
September 1st [now December 31] of the year in which the assessment was made.
The mere fact that the courts are not continuously in session does not affect the
question. The application must be made to the court, which can of necessity only be
to the court while in session, and it can only be made during the period prescribed by
the statute. Id. at 247-48, 126 S.E. at 197.
The Leesburg case is consistent with Union Tanning Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 610,
96 S.E. 780 (1918), in which the court stated that written pleadings under a tax application
were "unnecessary" but "permissible". Id. at 615, 96 S.E. at 780. As "a copy of the applica-
tion" is now usually required by section 58-1130 to be served on the Tax Commissioner, a
written application is now necessary.
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-45 and 8-46, repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1954, ch. 593, at
765.
44. 207 Va. 544, 151 S.E.2d 398 (1966).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
46. 207 Va. at 546, 151 S.E.2d at 400.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1146 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
48. The statute creating the right is section 58-1130 which provides the limitation "in
language so clear that its meaning cannot be fairly doubted." Leesburg v. Loudoun Nat'l
Bank, 141 Va. 244, 248, 126 S.E. 196, 197 (1925).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the mere filing of an application with the clerk of court within the
statutory period is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
The proper procedure to stop the running of the statute would seem
to be for the taxpayer to obtain a court order, as follows:
And it appearing to the court that a copy of the notice of the applica-
tion has been duly served on the State Tax Commissioner, it is upon
motion of the applicant ordered that the application be accepted for
consideration by the court and this action be docketed for oral argu-
ment on , 19_ 11
Another problem with the statute of limitations is the date on
which the statute begins to run. An application to court must be
made within two years of the year in which the assessment was
made.5 1 Many assessments are made at the year's end, usually by
computer. Where a taxpayer is not notified until the middle of
January that he has been assessed, he will understandably believe
he has been assessed in January. But his assessment notice may
carry a December date, the date the assessment was entered on the
computer. In today's world, the computer entry date would seem to
be the assessment date.5"
Section 58-1130 requires that the applicant be the taxpayer as-
sessed with the tax52 and that he be aggrieved by the assessment.
Where the tax has been passed on to a third party a Kentucky court
has held that "the appellee's vendees who actually paid the tax are
without recourse, both against the commonwealth and their ven-
dor. ' 53 This defense was asserted by the Tax Commissioner in
Commonwealth ex rel. Morrissett v. Shell Oil Co.," but the Virginia
49. Although the State Tax Commissioner is not a party to the application, at least until
he has answered or otherwise appeared, courtesy would require that the hearing date be made
a date convenient to the Assistant Attorney General representing the Commissioner.
50. If an amended return was filed under VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974), the
denial of relief thereunder constitutes an "assessment" as to matters first raised on the
amended return.
51. Cf. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 6203: "The assessment shall be made by recording the
liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary or his delegate in accordance with the
rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate."
52. The application should for this reason ordinarily be styled in the exact name appearing
on the assessment notice.
53. Shannon v. Hughes & Co., 270 Ky. 530, 109 S.W.2d 1174, 1176 (1937).
54. 210 Va. 163, 169 S.E.2d 434 (1969).
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Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the point, and there-
fore left this issue open in Virginia. The General Assembly has
indicated that the vendor/taxpayer in such an instance may bring
suit on behalf of his vendee by providing that "no interest will be
paid on sales taxes refunded to a dealer unless the dealer agrees to
pass such interest on to the purchaser."5 If an application for refund
of sales taxes is filed on behalf of the actual taxpayer, the pleadings
should allege that the proceeds from the suit will be paid to the
party who bore the ultimate burden of the tax. It is unlikely that a
Virginia court will ignore Virginia law in an effort to reach the
conclusion of First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax
Commissioner," that the purchaser is the taxpayer, but it may be
possible for the purchaser to bring suit as the equitable taxpayer, a
procedure which was permitted in Commonwealth v. Smallwood
Memorial Institute.57 Caution may require that simultaneous appli-
cations 8 be filed by the vendor and the vendee, in view of the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's decision denying a bank the right to sue on
behalf of its stockholders.59
In Virginia the taxpayer is given a choice of courts in which to file
an application. Any taxpayer may file in the court in which the
assessing officer qualified, or to which his bond and qualification
were returned."
An individual may also file in any court of record of the locality
in which he resides, and a domestic corporation or partnership has
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1140.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
56. 293 U.S. 339 (1968).
57. 124 Va. 142, 97 S.E. 805 (1919).
58. Although the question has not been raised in a reported decision, the procedures under
section 58-1130 are not designed for multiple applicants. A number of tax cases were joined
in one pleading in County Board v. Fogilo, 215 Va. 110, 205 S.E.2d 390 (1974), but the
county did not object. The better practice would be to file separate applications and request
consolidation for the hearing. See, e.g., Northern Virginia Doctors Hosp. Corp. v. Department
of Taxation, 213 Va. 504, 193 S.E.2d 684 (1973). If the problem is merely the misjoinder of
causes of action, the apparent willingness of the courts to order consolidation would indicate
that the misjoinder may not be fatal. If, however, the joinder of different applications is not
in accord with pre-1950 practices and procedure, the actions may be dismissed.
59. Main St. Bank v. City of Richmond, 122 Va. 574, 95 S.E. 386 (1918). VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-1140 now expressly permits the bank to bring suit.
60. A former acting Tax Commissioner qualified in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Article
VI, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia, however, precludes original jurisdiction of the Virginia
Supreme Court. The present Commissioner qualified in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Division I.
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a similar option in the locality in which its principal office is lo-
cated. The optional forum for a foreign corporation is a court of
record in "the county or city in which is located the office in this
State at which claims against the foreign corporation may be au-
dited, settled and paid."6 This office was the pre-1956 equivalent
of what is now referred to as the registered office6" and the quoted
language should not be construed to require that corporate records
be maintained at an office in this state. A court would probably
frown on forum shopping by a taxpayer by changing its registered
office, although nothing in the statutes would prohibit such a
change.
Neither the State Tax Commissioner, who is usually required to
be given notice of the application,63 nor the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, who formerly was required to defend the application,64 is origi-
nally a party to the judicial application. The application is insti-
tuted on an ex parte basis, and the initial pleadings should be so
drafted. 5 The Attorney General, although not required to do so, will
usually answer the application for the purpose of defining the issues
in controversy. The required period in which notice must be served
for this purpose was extended in 1973 from ten to twenty-one days. 6
The Commonwealth may, however, enter into binding settlements67
and waive compliance with the technical formalities of the statutes
in the same manner as if it were a party. 8 The application should
request interest, which is now permitted 9 but should not request
costs, for the taxing of costs against the Commonwealth is expressly
forbidden. 0 It would appear that an appeal by the Commissioner
should be by the Commonwealth at his relation.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 3847 (1942).
63. Notice is not required to be given to the Tax Commissioner unless the assessment was
made by the Department of Taxation, but it is advisable to give notice in all instances to
lessen the chance of a required rehearing.
64. Unless an attorney designated by the Tax Commissioner did so, see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-1135, repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 721, at 1013.
65. See 3 GREGORY, FORMS FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA ANNOTATED (4th ed. 1952), Nos.
1142, 1145, and 1149, pp. 179, 182, 187.
66. Va. Acts of Assembly 1973, ch. 280, at 369.
67. Commonwealth v. Schmetz, 116 Va. 62, 81 S.E. 45 (1914).
68. Commonwealth v. Columbian Paper Co., 143 Va. 332, 130 S.E. 421 (1925).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1140.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1139 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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The court may reduce an assessment and, furthermore, it is
clothed with the powers and duties of the authority assessing the tax
for the limited purpose of increasing the assessment.7' The basic
duty of the court is to determine to its satisfaction the proper
amount of the assessment. In this respect it has broad discretion
similar to equity. Presumably the use of a jury, even for the determi-
nation of facts, would be improper, for the responsibility of arriving
at a proper assessment is clearly fixed on the court. One recent case
goes so far as to imply that the court may be bound by the tax-
payer's pleadings. 72
If the taxpayer is successful in obtaining relief, his attorney
should insure that a copy of the court order of exoneration is certi-
fied by the clerk to the Tax Commissioner, for only then does the
statute of limitations begin to run against the Commissioner's stat-
utory right to a rehearing.73 The Commissioner is permitted to apply
for a rehearing at any time within six months after certification of
the order. This is true even if he has also noted an appeal.74 The
Virginia Supreme Court has described as "a manifest absurdity, as
well as a grave injustice to the taxpayer" 75 the power in a state
official to take an appeal and, having lost on appeal (perhaps on
proof of facts), to apply for a rehearing and then appeal again. Only
the realities of time prevent the Tax Commissioner from exercising
this power.
The taxpayer has one year from the date of the order of exonera-
tion to apply to the Comptroller for a refund if the tax has been
paid.76 Unless specific application is made, the taxpayer.should not
expect to receive his refund check merely because he has won in
court. After the expiration of one year from the date of the order,
the taxpayer will be forever barred from the recovery of his tax.
If the taxpayer is successful, the court's order of exoneration will
restrain the Commissioner from further collection proceedings.7
This is the first point in time when the Commissioner is so re-
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
72. Fray v. County of Culpeper, 212 Va. 148, 183 S.E.2d 175 (1971).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1137 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
74. Putnam v. Ford, 155 Va. 625, 155 S.E. 823 (1930).
75. Commonwealth v. Huntington, 148 Va. 97, 112, 138 S.E. 650, 655 (1927).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1136 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
77. Id.
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strained. If the taxpayer is unsuccessful, he may appeal and request
a supersedeas. 78
In most cases, however, the Tax Department will already have
collected the contested amount, since Section 58-115811 prohibits
suits for the purpose of restraining both the assessment and the
collection of taxes." The taxpayer will not usually have the oppor-
tunity of raising the invalidity of the tax as a defense, for the Tax
Department will most likely proceed in the nature of an administra-
tive garnishment,8' and the creditor will usually comply with the
administrative order. The Tax Department also utilizes a procedure
whereunder it may issue a warrant which has the effect of a judg-
ment lien, 2 but which the Department will rarely execute, waiting
instead for the taxpayer to attempt to sell the property. If the De-
partment does bring suit, the invalidity of the tax may be asserted
as a defense.83 However, the invalidity of the tax may not be asserted
in third party litigation.84
Injunctive Relief
Under certain hardship conditions, the taxpayer may seek an
injunction on the ground that he has no adequate remedy at law,
but he has a difficult burden to meet when attempting to show the
necessary-hardship conditions.
In County of Sussex v. Jarratt," the court held that without a
levy there can be no assessment and, without an assessment, Sec-
tion 58-1158 allows injunctive relief. The case could also, however,
be cited for the proposition that, without a valid levy, the court has
no authority to grant relief upon an application.
In Commonwealth v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,S" the court re-
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1138 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1158 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
80. If, however, the assessment is invalid on its face, it may be possible to enjoin the Tax
Commissioner from collection of the tax. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 141 Va. 116, 126 S.E.
220 (1925).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1010 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-41 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
83. Hurt v. City of Bristol, 104 Va. 213, 51 S.E. 223 (1905).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1010.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
85. 129 Va. 672, 106 S.E. 384 (1921).
86. 155 Va. 452, 155 S.E. 895 (1930).
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lied on Jarratt in striking an assessment where it found no levy, even
though the suit was instituted as an application to correct an erro-
neous assessment of taxes. In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co. v. Newport News,8" the court refused to apply Jarratt where the
only "assessment" was made under an ordinance alleged to be un-
constitutional. In Richmond v. Turnpike Authority,18 the court con-
strued its recent cases to hold "that relief under § 58-1145 of the
Virginia Code [the local tax equivalent of Section 58-1130] is not
confined to the correction of an assessment which is merely erro-
neous, but includes also levies and assessments claimed to be un-
constitutional, illegal and void."89 While not expressly overruling
Jarratt, the Turnpike Authority case requires that Jarratt be lim-
ited to its specific facts, if it is to be applied at all."
In the absence of unusual circumstances, a taxpayer would be
well advised to pursue both the administrative and judicial reme-
dies provided by the statutes. The Attorney General's Office will,
upon request, give full cooperation to the taxpayer's lawyer in order
to assure that the statutory requirements are met. Improperly
drafted applications are an embarrassment to the Tax Department,
which does not wish to have substantive issues decided on proce-
dural grounds. The cases are consistent in holding that the remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer.91 If a
lawyer is careful to watch his period of limitations, the statutes can
be convenient, elastic and fair.
87. 194 Va. 409, 73 S.E.2d 394 (1952).
88. 204 Va. 596, 132 S.E.2d 733 (1963).
89. Id. at 598, 132 S.E.2d at 735.
90. Jarrett may have a limited effect in one narrow area. In a local tax case, if the taxing
ordinance is wholly invalid for any reason other than the unconstitutionality of a state stat-
ute, no "tax" is imposed, and the appellant must meet the $300 jurisdictional amount to be
heard in the Virginia Supreme Court. City of Richmond v. Enbank, 179 Va. 70, 18 S.E.2d
397 (1942).
91. See, e.g., Todd v. Elizabeth City County, 191 Va. 52, 60 S.E.2d 23 (1950).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 9 FALL 1974 NUMBER 1
EDITORIAL BOARD
JOHN G. COLAN
Editor-in-Chief
STUART R. KAPLAN
Executive Editor
GARY J. SPAHN
Note and Comments Editor
COLIN R. GIBB
Managing Editor
HUGH T. ANTRIM
WILLIAM A. BEETON, JR.
ALBERT D. BUGG, JR.
*EDWARD A. BECK, III
JOSEPH V. BUONASSISSI, II
C. FELIX CROSS, Ill
WAYNE R. HAIRFIELD
DAVID L. HORNE
DUNCAN P. REID
Articles Editor
JOHN H. HERBIG
Decisions and Legislation Editor
WILLIAM G. HANCOCK
Developments Editor
STAFF
HAROLD L. KESTENBAUM
MARY LOUISE KRAMER
BENJAMIN LACY
DENNIS J. McLOUGHLIN
THOMAS P. OLIVIERI
ROBERT D. PERROW
GREGORY L. RUPE
*KENNON C. WALDEN, II
STEPHEN M. YOST
BUSINESS STAFF
LAWRENCE T. JONES
Business Manager
JANET FRITZ
Assistant Business Manager
HENRY L. SNEAD, JR.
Faculty Advisor
*Graduated, May 1974.
The materials published in the Review express the views of the writers. Publication does
not imply agreement with any statement made.
